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The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers
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INTRODUCTION

What is to be gained by using empirical evidence to rank or "judge" judges?
Such empirical studies claim two major benefits. First, because the criteria are
ostensibly apolitical, the resulting rankings should identify the "best" judges
across the political spectrum and thereby improve, for instance, the Supreme
Court nomination process.' Second, because the criteria are "objective" 2 rather
than "subjective,"3 the possibility of unconscious bias is reduced greatly and
these studies may at last yield answers to two difficult questions: (1)whether
female judges are better than male judges; 4 and (2) whether appointed judges
are better than their elected counterparts.5 These claims in turn rest on two
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Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 25-32 (2004)
[hereinafter Choi &Gulati, Choosing]; Stephen Choi &Mitu Gulati, A Tournament
of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 300-04 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati,
Tournament].
See Choi &Gulati, Choosing,supra note 1,at 29.
See id. at 36.
See Stephen J. Choi et al., Judging Women 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 483, 2oo), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1479724.
See Stephen I. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionalsor Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 2

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=ioo8989 ("To test the conventional wisdom that

appointed judges are better than elected judges, we use a tripartite definition of
judicial quality-productivity, opinion-quality, and independence.").
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assumptions: that the legal empiricists have selected the right qualities to
measure and that their methodology for doing so is accurate.
In the years since the first empirical rankings were published, both judges
and scholars have cast grave doubt on the accuracy of these assumptions,6 and
we seek to contribute to this discussion.7 We believe that there is now a general
consensus that (1) the judicial virtues the legal empiricists set out to measure
probably have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2)
even if they did, the empiricists' chosen variables have not measured those
virtues accurately. As matters now stand, the benefits professed by the
empiricists have not been achieved by their models.'
The failure of empirical rankings to deliver the benefits promised by their
proponents is enough to raise serious doubts about whether the enterprise is
worthwhile. But, even more importantly, these rankings stand to create-and
indeed, already may have created-several significant harms. By generating and
then publicizing unreliable claims about the relative quality of judges, these
studies mislead both decision-makers and the public, degrade discussion of
judging, and could, if taken seriously, perniciously alter the behavior of judges
themselves. Far from improving the process for selecting judges and justices,
reliance on such empirical rankings would distract all involved from serious
inquiry and debate about the nature of judging, the process by which judges
should be selected, and contested visions of justice itself.
In this Essay, we focus on the presently dominant models of judging judges
advanced by Professors Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner, among

6.

See, e.g., Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman & William P. Marshall, The Continuing
Search for a Meaningful Model of Judicial Rankings and Why It (Unfortunately)
Matters, 58 DUKE L.J. 1645 (2009); Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the
Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1055 (2005); Bruce M. Selya, Pullingfrom the

Ranks? Remarks on the Proposed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System To
Guide the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 32
Patrick S. Shin, Judging Merit, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.

FLA. ST.

U. L.

REV. 1281 (2005);

Laura Denvir Stith,
Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743
137 (2004);

(2009).

7.

8.

The authors include a judge who was one of the seventy-four federal appellate
judges that Professors Choi and Gulati ranked in their article, Choi & Gulati,
Choosing, supra note 1. This judge learned in conversation at a Duke Law School
workshop in September 2009, that he was listed near the bottom quartile on the
"independence" ranking, see id. at 114 tbl.H, a fact that he finds amusing and not
meaningful.
We do appreciate, however, that other common measures of judicial quality are
also wanting-in particular the ubiquitous reliance on a judge's "reputation" on
the bench and within the bar. To the extent that Choi and his coauthors are
motivated by the desire for more reliable gauges, we are sympathetic to this
motivation.
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others ("Choi et al."). 9 We explain in Part I why these models are deeply
flawed-revisiting arguments made by others and positing new ones-and then
discuss in Part II why there is little hope for meaningful improvement. In Part
III, we discuss the harms of relying on imperfect models and explain why the
current enterprise of "judging judges" has significant costs.
I.

FLAWS IN THE CURRENT MODELS

Choi et al. posit three "objective" measures of judicial merit: (i)
productivity; (2) opinion quality (or what they sometimes call "influence"); and
(3) independence. Although Choi and his coauthors have revised their models
from time to time, they consistently have professed to be able to measure these
qualities from datasets of appellate judicial opinions" by looking to,
respectively: (i) how many signed opinions a judge publishes;" (2) how many
times the judge's opinions have been cited in other jurisdictions;'" and (3) how
many times the judge has dissented in cases in which the majority opinion is
written by a member of the same political party. 3 The authors then use their
measures to rank judges and also to determine whether female judges are
"better" than male judges, and whether appointed judges are "better" than

11.

The first few articles to advance a model to "rank" judges were authored by
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati. Eric Posner and others subsequently collaborated
with them.
The empiricists do not apply their model to trial judges, who make innumerable
decisions from the bench as well as in written opinions. Some commentators have
suggested that Professor Choi and his colleagues would fare better by studying
trial judges instead of appellate judges. See Ahmed E. Taha, Information and the
Selection of Judges: A Comment on "A Tournament of Judges," 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1401, 1412 (2005) ("Because federal district judges generally make decisions
alone, their opinions are less likely to be affected by the preferences of their
colleagues. In addition, they have almost complete discretion over choices such as
whether to publish an opinion in a particular case. Thus quantitative measures of
judicial performance will be measures only of a particular judge's behavior rather
than also of the influence of other judges on a panel." (footnotes omitted)).
Professor Mitu Gulati and Duke Law School Dean David Levi (who is a former
United States District Judge), have argued that because "the literature on judicial
measurement has largely ignored the question of how best to measure trial court
performance," it would be beneficial for empiricists to study trial judges. David F.
Levi &Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures,77 UMKC L. REV. 381, 403-04 (2008). Gulati
and Levi note, however, that empiricists would need to develop different
measures to do so because, for example, publication rates are less meaningful for
trial judges than for appellate judges. Id. at 404-07.
Choi & Gulati, Choosing,supra note 1,at 42-43.

12.

Id. at 49-50.

13.

Id. at

9.

iO.

58-59.
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elected judges. As noted above, several commentators have identified serious
14
flaws in this general model.
First, the judicial virtues selected by Choi et al. do not adequately capture
the qualities good judges possess and the activities in which they engage.
Professors Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman, and William P. Marshall point out
that "because of data limitations, [Choi et al.'s] study ignores aspects of judicial
behavior that are arguably more important than the ones proxied, such as
integrity, fairness, open-mindedness, thoroughness, and temperament."' 5 As
Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith of the Supreme Court of Missouri has
explained: "No matter how much one breaks down the criteria used as
measures, those criteria still miss the essence of judging."' 6 Moreover, a model
with only the three aforementioned virtues fails to account for the other
important work that appellate judges do in addition to opinion writing,
"including judicial administration and lower court supervision, serving on
government commissions, teaching at law schools, writing scholarly articles,
and training other judges,"' 7 and, we would add, expending significant time
editing or commenting on other opinions that will be published under the
name of a colleague. All of this work is both critical for the functioning of
courts and a significant part of what "good" judges do.
Second, even if we could agree that Choi et al. had selected judicial qualities
that are possessed by the "best" judges, they have failed to measure those
qualities accurately. Beginning with productivity, it seems obvious beyond
peradventure that a judge may be productive by doing things beyond
publishing her own signed opinions. In many courts, judges issue far more
unpublished opinions than published ones. Furthermore, the measure fails to
account for another common and important form of judicial production: the
per curiam opinion (which is published without the identification of the
author). Although practices with respect to per curiam opinions differ among
state courts and among federal circuit courts, in many jurisdictions they
constitute a significant portion of all published opinions. And although per
curiam opinions tend, on average, to be shorter than their signed counterparts,
they still consume much of the time and energy that signed published opinions
require. Because the datasets used by Choi et al. do not include per curiam
opinions, and because the writing of these opinions is not distributed evenly
within a given court, the statistical analysis undertaken by Choi et al. is
incomplete and quite possibly misleading. Indeed, judges in the state dataset

14.
15.

16.
17.

See sources cited supranote 6.
Baker et al., supra note 6, at 1657.
Stith, supra note 6, at 1744.
Baker et al., supra note 6, at 1657. Judges also serve on rules committees and
engage in activities of the bar more generally. Id. at 1659.
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published on average only about twenty-two signed opinions per year;i" issuing
even a few per curiam opinions more than the average should significantly
affect the judge's "productivity" ranking.
The point is not simply that per curiam opinions (along with unpublished
opinions) are a major category of written judicial production that Choi et al.
have failed to consider in their methodology. The more critical point is that
their methodology will never be able to account for these opinions. Because, as
their designation suggests, per curiam opinions are the opinions "by the court,"
they are not signed by the principal drafter (and, similarly, unpublished
opinions are unsigned). In short, there is no way to know which judge should
receive credit for the effort of writing these opinions. This important category
of data is simply missing, and it cannot be discovered by Choi et al. or anyone
else.
"Opinion quality," too, is an ambiguous and potentially broad-ranging
concept. Yet, all that Choi et al. measure is the number of citations that a
judge's opinions receive in published opinions from other jurisdictions.
Citation counts need not, of course, reflect quality. Even as a rough measure of
one type of judicial influence, the chosen proxy is wanting. There are many
factors that contribute to opinion citation counts that have nothing to do with
the insight or persuasiveness of the opinion and nothing to do with the ongoing
influence of the opinion writer. 19 If a novel issue arises in one state court that
has been addressed in only a few other states, the opinions from those other
jurisdictions are likely to be cited whether or not they are persuasive or
otherwise of high quality. There is a simple, temporal component to citations as
well. Unless there is a seminal case for a particular proposition, many judges
prefer to cite recent cases articulating the governing standard or principle.
Accordingly, there may frequently be situations in which Judge A publishes an
opinion enunciating a particular rule or standard, and a few years later, Judge B
follows and restates this very same principle of law. Simply by virtue of being
more recent, the later opinion may garner more out-of-state citations going
forward.2"
Moreover, using citation counts as a measure of opinion quality appears to
introduce a bias in favor of those decisions (and those courts) that reach out to
resolve issues left to legislative determination by courts in other jurisdictions."
18.

Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and
Information Forcing:Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313,
1320 (2009).

19.

See, e.g., Frank B. Cross &Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383,
1391-93 (2009) (discussing criticisms of citation analysis).

20.

See Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1392
(2005) ("Subsequent opinions will be more likely to be cited if they are the most
recent opinion stating the proposition .. ").
Relatedly, as Chief Justice Stith noted: "[T]he number of out-of-state citations
largely measures a characteristic other than the intrinsic worth of the opinions; it
measures which state courts take the lead in addressing new and developing areas

21.
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Once one court identifies or articulates a new right or rule of law, litigants in
other states or circuits will urge their courts to quite literally follow suitresulting perhaps in opinions that cite the novel judicial proposition even if that
proposition is thoroughly rejected. This situation reflects neither judicial
influence nor opinion quality, much less "good" judicial behavior that should
be rewarded in judicial rankings.
Finally, there are serious flaws in the way that Choi et al. measure
"independence." Although we readily agree that independence-in the sense of
not being influenced by certain personal, political, or other inappropriate
considerations-is a valuable attribute in a judge, that quality should not be
confused with what the model actually measures, which is a disposition to
dissent. Dissenting frequently, regardless of the political affiliation of other
panel members, might well be due to characteristics associated with "bad"
judging." As Professor Baker and his coauthors have noted, "independence
defined in this way may actually measure a lack of quality in judging, including
deficiencies in collegiality and leadership, and a propensity for judicial activism
outside the ideological mainstream."23
We believe this problem deserves even greater emphasis. There is an
obvious characteristic of good judges that is in tension with the measure of
independence chosen by Choi et al.: the ability to build a coalition or achieve
consensus. Nowhere does their analysis credit the judge who is skilled in
convincing other judges to join his or her opinions. Perhaps such a judge writes
particularly sound opinions and therefore has an easier time convincing other
judges to sign on with her. Or perhaps the judge is simply adept at finding
compromises or alternative routes to reaching a decision that command greater

22.

23.

of the law." Stith, supra note 6, at 1749. Even if one believes that addressing
developing issues is a component of judicial influence, it is not, for the reasons
that Chief Justice Stith and we have noted, necessarily related to the quality of the
opinion in which the new issues are addressed.
See Selya, supra note 6, at 1290 ("[T]here plainly is a point at which dissenters
cross the line from enriching thought into either intellectual preening or
obstructionist polemicism.").
Baker et al., supra note 6, at 1661; cf Jos6 A. Cabranes, Some Brief Reflections on
Judging in the Federal Courts 9-1o (Nov. io, 2oo6) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Yale Law &Policy Review) ("[J] udicial activism at the triallevel is not
necessarily an ideological question or a political question or a jurisprudential
question-it is, rather, a psychological question; whether a judge is 'active' or
'passive' is often simply a reflection of the judge's psychological disposition rather
than his political worldview. The most important 'ism' in a trial judge [isn't
liberalism or conservatism but] ... metabolism .... '[f]udicial activism' at the trial
level often may mean little more than that a particular judge is assertive and
demanding-even overbearing-in the assertion of his will and his authority. In
some such circumstances, the assertion of judicial power may as readily be a
function of an individual jurist's disposition to command and to take
charge....").
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agreement. Yet, such a judge will dissent less frequently, regardless of the
political affiliation of the other panel members. 4
Here again, the fundamental flaw with the approach of Choi et al. is that
there is no clear way to solve the measurement problem. To credit dissents as
evidence of independence necessarily discredits coalition-building as relevant to
judicial quality. Without additional information, there is no way of knowing
whether judges who frequently dissent are independent, are poor at persuasion
and coalition building, or simply have idiosyncratic views.
II.

WHY THE CURRENT MODELS CANNOT BE IMPROVED

In response to these objections, the empiricists' natural reaction might well
be to continue adjusting their current proxy variables or adding new variables
in subsequent studies. They may hope that by refining their model, they can
eventually fix whatever deficiencies currently exist and improve the enterprise
of judging judges. We hope that this is not the direction taken.
The overarching problem is not that the methodology is flawed (though it
is), but that the enterprise itself is misguided. Choi et al. cannot simply tweak
their model to incorporate many of the concerns we and others have noted,
because the data inevitably conflate countervailing qualities. Given the
complexity of judging, it is not surprising that a single data point (e.g., a
published opinion, a citation, or a dissent) may be both consistent and
inconsistent with admirable characteristics. Most importantly, the very meaning
of "good" judging is contested in a heterogeneous, pluralistic society. For some
opinion elites (including, apparently, Choi et al.), 25 the Supreme Court
nomination process would be improved if it were less partisan and if it were less
dependent on a nominee's views on politically charged issues. For others, this
development would be worrisome, denying what is ultimately the political
character of both presidential nomination and senatorial consent. 6 Similarly,
24.

25.

26.

In any event, myriad factors not subject to quantitative analysis may prompt a
judge to avoid writing a dissent even when the judge has doubts about the
soundness of a majority opinion. Such factors may include a desire to avoid
solidifying the law in favor of the majority's position resulting from a dissenting
opinion that loudly proclaims what the law is not, that is, a judge may prefer to
wait for another case in which she might prevail.
See Choi &Gulati, Choosing, supra note 1, at 82 ("[T]he goal for our tournament
was to provide an improvement over the current system. The harder question is
Whether our measures could play a role in a more bipartisan, but subjective,
selection process of the type that some would claim we have had in the past. Our
view is that they should; objective measures will serve as a check on the inevitable
biases that any system of subjective analysis will possess (and vice versa).").
See

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE

OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 106-10 (1985)

(arguing that

the President and the Senate should consider a nominee's political leanings to
create the best-functioning Court); David S. Law, Appointing FederalJudges: The
President, the Senate, and the Prisoner'sDilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 500
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analyses purporting to ascertain whether female judges are better than male
judges and whether appointed judges are better than elected ones founder not
just on data and methodological limitations, but also (and unavoidably) on
disputed understandings of what it means to be "better."
III.

THE HARMS OF RELYING ON IMPERFECT MODELS

While the project of Choi et al. is unsustainable on its own terms, its false
promise-that the quality of a judge (indeed, of judging) can be captured by a
composite ranking-threatens to do real damage to the judicial system and
public understanding and perception of judges. First, far from improving the
Supreme Court nomination process, increased reliance on anything like these
rankings could arbitrarily derail or encourage particular nominations. Consider
the appellate judge who writes more than her share of per curiam or
unpublished opinions, who hesitates to propound novel legal theories, and who
seldom dissents because she knows how to build a majority. This judge will
rank toward the bottom of all three measures employed by Choi et al.: signed
opinions, citations by other courts, and dissents from others appointed by
presidents of her party. Is there now a presumption-one that is irrebuttable as
a practical matter 7-that she is unqualified? If the available empirical models
are treated as actually indicating something important, will we lose such judges,
either because the media will be unduly influenced by this seemingly "expert"
and "objective" ranking or because political actors will make the calculation, in
part on the basis of media reports, simply not to nominate them?
The delusive allure of the empirical judicial ranking model already has
distorted critical debates about the judiciary. Recently, several articles in the
popular media have reported the findings of Choi et al. as definitive
conclusions. In May 2009, the New York Times published an online piece
entitled, "Assessing Sotomayor's Influence," which purported to reveal how
influential Justice Sonia Sotomayor had been as a judge based on how many
("It is, arguably, both necessary and appropriate to examine closely the
ideological leanings of those seeking lifetime appointment to high federal office.")
(footnote omitted); Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, 'Modesty and
Stability' on the Bench: How John Roberts Can Convince Democrats To Vote for
Him
(July
27,
2005),
available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/
new website/record.cfm?id=260552 ("I think we've won the argument that
judicial philosophy and ideology are important and proper considerations in
confirming a nominee.... Senators from across the political spectrum-from
Brownback to Specter to Kennedy-have emphasized the importance of knowing
a candidate's views before voting to confirm.").
See Baker et al., supra note 6, at 1666 ("The question is whether the information
presented in response to the rankings will actually be able to rebut the
presumptions they create. We do not believe they will."); Bybee & Miles, supra
note 6, at 1073 ("The ranking of judges creates a new set of data easily grasped by
the public. A President who nominates number forty-two on the list will have to
explain himself.").
(2005)

27.
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citations her opinions had received.2" The piece did not mention any criticisms
of the use of citation counts as a measure of either quality or influence.
Indeed, it is instructive to examine how Judge Sotomayor and Judge
Samuel Alito, both nominated to the Supreme Court after the first article by
Professors Choi and Gulati was published, have fared in the wake of this
scholarship. Judge Alito, sitting on the Third Circuit from January 1, 1998
through December 31, 2001 (the time period for the study), ranked sixteenth out
of the seventy-four judges. Considering the company, perhaps that is "not too
shabby," though it does not sound as good when stated slightly differentlythat he was in the seventy-eighth percentile of federal appellate judges.2 9 In any
event, the media did not trumpet his overall ranking, but rather, that he was
"among the most independent judges."30 Like all numbers, the Choi et al.
rankings can be spun.
In fact, the numbers have been spun not only by the media but also by one
of Professor Choi's coauthors. Judge Sotomayor was not included in the Choi
and Gulati ranking of federal judges because she was not appointed to the court
of appeals until mid-1998. 11 Shortly after Judge Sotomayor was nominated to
the Supreme Court in 2009, Professor Eric Posner published an online analysis
that sought to extrapolate from Judge Sotomayor's 1999-20Ol data where she
would have placed in the original ranking. Posner concluded:
The bottom line is that Judge Sotomayor is about average, or maybe a
bit below average, for a federal appellate judge. These results are far
from conclusive, but one might think that put the burden on Judge
Sotomayor's defenders to come forward with stronger reasons for her
nomination than they have so far."

28.

29.

30.

Assessing Sotomayor's Influence, N.Y. TIMEs.coM, May 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/o5/28/us/politics/o529-judge
-graphic.html. This multimedia presentation was linked to a print article, Jo
Becker &Adam Liptak, Assertive Style Raises Questions on Demeanor, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2009, at A14.
See Choi &Gulati, Choosing, supra note 1, at 113 tbl.H.
See, e.g., Study Ranks Alito Among Most Independent Judges, USA TODAY.COM,
NOV. 22, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2005-11-22alitoresearchers x.htm.

31.

See Judge Sonia Sotomayor: What the Data Show, Posting of Eric Posner to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2009/o5/13/judge-sonia-sotomayor-whatthe-data-show/ (May 13, 2oog, 11:4o EDT) ("Unfortunately, Choi and Gulati
excluded Judge Sotomayor from the data set because she was appointed in 1998
and thus does not have complete data for that year.").

32.

Id.

321
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Not surprisingly, the defenders did come forth. Two weeks later, Professor
Posner announced a different conclusion: "Sotomayor looks good."33 Working
with Professors Gulati and Choi, he examined Judge Sotomayor's opinions
between 2004 and 2006, and compared her not to all other federal judges but to
a subgroup consisting of "other court of appeals judges who were rumored to
be on President Obama's shortlist, and with a kind of control group consisting
of court of appeals judges rumored to be on President Bush's shortlist in
34
2005."
Compared to this group, she ranked high both in total number of
citation counts and in citations per opinion (the latter being a measure
discussed, but not employed, in the rankings previously published by Choi and
Gulati).35 Posner referred to the total citation-count data as "a measure of
general influence." 6 He noted that the use of citation counts had been criticized
but addressed that concern only with the non sequitur: "Still, the numbers seem
pretty robust, and the comparison here is with well-respected judges, not with
ordinary judges." 37 Of course, if the measure does not make sense, it is not clear
how the numbers can be "robust." Moreover, the second blog posting seemed
to undercut the core of the larger empirical project, for it both downplayed the
other two measures-productivity and independence3S-and reverted to
subjective general reputation ("not ordinary") as a measure of quality.
Even though commentators have powerfully criticized their model, the
authors cannot seem to resist trumpeting its claims-without acknowledging
the model's severe limitations. In October 2009, Professor Choi and his
coauthors published an article in Slate, entitled "Do Women Make Better
Judges? Asked and Answered-With Data, ' 39 which the New York Times picked

33.

Judge Sotomayor: More Data,and a New Conclusion, Posting of Eric Posner to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1243482653.shtml (May 27, 2009,
23:50 EDT).

34.

Id.

35.

See Choi &Gulati, Choosing, supra note i, at 54.

36.
37.
38.

Posner, supra note 33.
Id.
Judge Sotomayor did not fare as well as most of the subgroup on productivity,
namely the number of signed opinions. Professor Posner quite plausibly suggested
that the Second Circuit may have a norm of publishing fewer signed opinions
than other circuits-an influence for which Professor Choi and his colleagues
usually control in their empirical analysis, see Choi & Gulati, Choosing,supra note
1,at 45-46, but which apparently was not controlled for here. Posner pronounced
Judge Sotomayor "about average" with respect to the number of dissenting
opinions per signed opinions (a measure not included in the published ranking).
Owing to a "lack of time," however, he did not undertake to measure her
"independence" ranking. Posner, supra note 33.
Stephen Choi et al., Do Women Make Better Judges? Asked and Answered-with
Data, SLATE, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2231166/.

39.
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40
up in a blog posting, "Women Judges Less Credentialed, but Equally Good."
Thus, both the media and the model's authors proactively publicize the
"results" of what the authors know to be a limited or flawed model. This
activity looks more like false advertising than scholarship.
CONCLUSION

Studying judges-both what they do and what it means for them to do
their job well-is important. The common, informal practice of judging judges
on the basis of general "reputation" within the bar or among other judges may
be inadequate, fraught with misunderstanding, and subject to manipulation by
judges or by those who comment on the work of judges, among others. But a
more rigorous study of judges must be approached with an appreciation that
the job of judging is complicated and multifaceted; judging judges should not
be reduced to the counting of discrete data points that yield ordinal rankings.
Given the limitations of available data, the model developed by Choi et al.
cannot accurately measure even what it purports to measure: productivity,
opinion quality, and independence. Given the nature of judging, we doubt that
any such data-driven model ever can describe what constitutes "good" or "bad"
judging, at least not to the satisfaction of those who take the time to study the
models.
Whatever "good judging" may be, it is not to be found in how individual
judges score on a law-professor-generated rating system based on crude data
and a shallow understanding of the art and science of judging. The biggest cost
of judging judges by these numbers would be if political decision-makers (not
to mention judges themselves) alter their behavior in response to the existence
of the Choi et al. rating system. In that event, the entire ranking project not only
will have failed to identify good judging, but also will be counterproductive to
that end.

40.

Posting of Catherine Rampell to Economix, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
(Oct. 7, 2009,
200 9 /1o/07/women-judges-less-credentialed-but-equally-good/
19:45 EDT).
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